Border Trade Must Serve the Unemployed Youth, Not Just the Affluent

Border Trade and the Right to Earn: A Case for Small Traders in Gilgit-Baltistan

The recent election of Haji Muhammad Iqbal as the unopposed President of the Gilgit-Baltistan Import and Export Association at Sost is a welcome development, particularly if the new leadership takes up the cause of legitimate concessions for the large and growing number of unemployed people—especially the region's youth—who look towards cross-Khunjrab trade as a means of earning an honest livelihood.

It comes at a time when Pak-China border trade requires not merely representation of the business community, but a clear policy direction that recognises the important distinction between large commercial interests and the livelihood needs of ordinary people.

This distinction assumes particular importance in Gilgit-Baltistan, as I had earlier pointed out in these columns in my article “Awaiting Redress: The Gilgit-Baltistan Discourse,” published on August 2, 2025.

It is noteworthy that Pakistan and China concluded a border-trade agreement in October 1967 for the exchange of goods between Gilgit and Kashgar. This historical fact deserves greater recognition in today's discussion of cross-border commerce, because it demonstrates that trade across this frontier is not a new phenomenon but has long been connected with the economic life of the people of the region.

Yet much of the contemporary discussion of Pak-China trade tends to revolve around trade volumes, customs revenue and the interests of established importers. Comparatively little attention is given to the young person carrying a modest quantity of lawful merchandise in the hope of earning his livelihood.

It is precisely this person who needs the protection of a sensible public policy.

Gilgit-Baltistan possesses enormous geographical advantages because of its proximity to China. But its people cannot fully benefit from this strategic location unless border trade is structured in a manner that creates broad-based economic opportunity. The region has limited industrialisation, scarce cultivable land and insufficient employment opportunities outside the public sector, tourism and small commerce. Consequently, small-scale border trade has acquired an importance far greater than its monetary volume alone would suggest.

For an affluent businessman, a regulatory delay may be a financial inconvenience. For a small trader, the same delay may mean the loss of his entire month's income.

This is why the problems of small traders engaged in baggage and border trade deserve a distinct policy response.

The government should not necessarily treat a young person with limited capital in exactly the same manner as a large-scale commercial importer. This does not mean giving anyone a licence to evade customs duties, circumvent regulations or misuse the border-trade facility. On the contrary, it means bringing small traders firmly within a clear, lawful and transparent regulatory framework.

A dedicated small-trader regime could provide reasonable trading limits, simplified documentation, predictable customs valuation, transparent duties and faster clearance procedures. Digital registration and receipts could further ensure that genuine traders are identifiable and that the system remains protected against abuse.

Such a policy would serve two purposes simultaneously: protecting legitimate small traders while preventing the capture or exploitation of border trade by powerful commercial interests.

There is also a danger in excessive regulation. Whenever procedures become complicated, expensive or unpredictable, the small trader is usually the first to disappear.

Those with substantial capital can employ agents, lawyers, customs consultants and transport networks. A young man operating with modest savings cannot. Excessive bureaucratic complexity can therefore unintentionally transform what could be a broad-based livelihood opportunity into an arena dominated by those who already possess financial power.

That would be an unfortunate outcome for Gilgit-Baltistan.

The new leadership of the Import and Export Association therefore has an important responsibility. Its advocacy should not be confined to the interests of established importers and exporters. It should become a voice for the entire spectrum of the trading community, particularly unemployed and economically vulnerable youth whose livelihood may depend upon small-scale trade.

The authorities in Pakistan and China should likewise recognise the social dimension of border commerce. The objective should not simply be to facilitate the movement of goods across the Khunjerab border. It should also be to ensure that a meaningful share of the economic benefits generated by that movement reaches the people living closest to the border and the communities that have historically depended upon cross-border commerce.

A sensible policy could, for example, establish a separate category for genuine small traders, with clearly defined limits, documentation and obligations. Traders who comply with the rules should be given predictable access to the system, while those who misuse the facility should face appropriate penalties.

This would be far better than imposing increasingly complicated restrictions upon everyone because of the misconduct of a few.

The same principle should apply to transportation and customs procedures. Predictability is itself an economic benefit.

A small trader can plan his business if he knows what he is permitted to bring, what duty he will have to pay and how long clearance is likely to take. What destroys small commerce is not regulation as such, but uncertainty, inconsistency and disproportionate compliance costs.

The government's objective should therefore be to transform border trade from an uncertain and sometimes precarious livelihood into a regulated form of self-employment for ordinary citizens.

This is particularly important for the youth of Gilgit-Baltistan. Asking an unemployed young graduate or semi-skilled worker simply to "find a job" is not, by itself, an employment policy. Where formal employment opportunities are limited, government must create an environment in which citizens can create their own lawful livelihoods.

Small-scale Pak-China trade can be one such avenue.

The measure of success should consequently not be the number of wealthy importers who increase their turnover. Nor should it be judged solely by the volume or monetary value of goods crossing the border.

The more meaningful question is: how many ordinary young people of Gilgit-Baltistan are able to earn an honest and respectable livelihood because of this trade?

If the answer is hundreds or thousands, border trade is performing an important social and economic function. If, on the other hand, its benefits increasingly accrue to those who already possess wealth while small traders are squeezed out by regulations, costs and middlemen, then the policy requires reconsideration.

The election of a new leadership at Sost therefore offers an opportunity to initiate a wider and more constructive conversation.

Haji Muhammad Iqbal and the association he now represents can use their representative position to press for a policy that recognises the human face of border trade.

The young man engaged in small-scale commerce should not be regarded merely as a trader seeking a concession. He is a citizen seeking employment.

And there is a fundamental difference between the two.

Pakistan's border-trade policy should not merely make trade easier for those who can afford to trade on a large scale. It should also make lawful self-employment possible for those who have little else.

For Gilgit-Baltistan, this is not simply a commercial question. It is a question of economic justice, youth dignity and regional stability.