Danyore Manugah Glacier: A Warning That Must Not Be Ignored
The authorities must move from post-disaster response to anticipatory protection
A recent report by Abshar TV Gilgit-Baltistan, dated 14 September 2026, has drawn attention to a potentially serious hazard above Danyore: the Manugah Nullah and its glacier system, from where a sudden surge of water, ice, debris and boulders could potentially descend towards inhabited areas.
It is worth noting that Danyore, lying in close proximity to Gilgit city, has emerged as one of the rapidly urbanizing settlements of Gilgit-Baltistan. Its convenient location, expanding infrastructure and growing economic significance have made it an increasingly attractive destination for people migrating from other parts of the region. Every year, a rising number of families and individuals move to this bustling township in search of employment, education, healthcare and better livelihood opportunities. This steady influx is transforming Danyore from what was once predominantly a rural settlement into an expanding urban centre, bringing with it both considerable opportunities and mounting challenges in terms of housing, transport, water supply, sanitation, waste management and environmental sustainability.
The report carries a simple but compelling demand from the local population: an SCOM/mobile communication tower should be installed at or near the Manugah Nullah so that an emergency warning can reach people downstream without delay.
This demand deserves immediate attention.
It would be a mistake, however, to regard the matter merely as one of installing a telephone tower. What is required is a proper multi-layered early-warning and disaster-risk-reduction system, combining communications, scientific monitoring, local preparedness, evacuation planning and physical protection.
The warning signs are already there
The Manugah Nullah is not an entirely theoretical risk. On 20 August 2026, the Danyore administration reportedly inspected the nullah after identifying the potential danger posed by floodwater, debris and large boulders to the water complex and storage tank. Representatives of GBDMA, C&W, W&P&D, Mines & Minerals, LG&RD and the Revenue Department participated in the assessment, and reconstruction of a protective embankment was considered necessary.
More significantly, the GB government itself has acknowledged the consequences of a previous disaster in Manugah Nullah. On 11 August 2026, the Chief Minister paid tribute to workers who lost their lives while voluntarily helping restore the water channel after the nullah had been affected by a natural disaster and flood. The government also announced plans for a road and channelisation works in the nullah.
These developments should be viewed not as isolated incidents but as warning signals requiring a permanent risk-management strategy.
It is not necessary to wait for another tragedy
The reference in the Abshar TV report to the Tali Das incident is particularly pertinent. Mountain disasters often provide only a very short window between the appearance of danger and the arrival of a destructive flood wave downstream.
In such circumstances, the question should not be:
“Has a disaster occurred?”
It should be:
“What can be done before one occurs?”
That is the essence of modern disaster management.
A glacier-related flood does not necessarily have to originate from a spectacular glacial lake visible to the naked eye. In a high-mountain environment, sudden glacier or snowmelt, blockage and subsequent release, landslide-dammed water, intense rainfall, debris flows and combinations of these phenomena can produce extremely destructive flows through a confined nullah.
Therefore, the Manugah catchment deserves a site-specific scientific hazard assessment, rather than waiting for another destructive event to establish its vulnerability.
An SCOM tower is necessary—but it is only the first step
The local demand for an SCOM tower is entirely reasonable because communication is a critical component of an early-warning system. But a tower by itself cannot detect a GLOF or flash flood.
The authorities should therefore establish an integrated Manugah Nullah Early Warning System (MNEWS) comprising:
1. Scientific surveillance of the glacier and upper catchment
The glacier, any associated glacial lakes, unstable slopes, channels and potential blockage points should be mapped and monitored.
This should involve the GBDMA, NDMA, Pakistan Meteorological Department, WAPDA and relevant geological/glaciological institutions, with technical assistance from organisations possessing Himalayan/Karakoram expertise.
Satellite imagery, drones and periodic field surveys can be used to identify:
- expansion or formation of glacial lakes;
- unusual glacier movement or retreat;
- cracks and unstable ice masses;
- landslide-prone slopes;
- possible natural dams;
- changes in the drainage channel;
- accumulation of debris and boulders; and
- possible flood pathways towards Danyore and adjoining settlements.
Pakistan's own National Disaster Management Plan already calls for real-time monitoring, automatic sensors, hazard mapping, remote sensing and timely communication with vulnerable communities as components of GLOF risk reduction.
2. Install automatic sensors—not merely a communication tower
The Manugah system should ideally include water-level/flow sensors, rainfall gauges, temperature sensors and, where technically justified, cameras or other remote monitoring equipment.
If an abnormal rise in water level or other predetermined trigger is detected, an alert should automatically reach a designated control room and responsible officials.
The objective should be to create a chain:
Detection → Verification → Warning → Evacuation → Rescue
rather than discovering the disaster after the flood has already reached the populated area.
NDMA has specifically emphasised the importance of automatic sensors and real-time monitoring for GLOF preparedness.
3. Establish redundant communication
The proposed SCOM tower should be accompanied by alternative communication channels.
A disaster can itself damage electricity, fibre-optic cables or cellular infrastructure. Therefore, the system should have redundancy through:
- SCOM/mobile coverage;
- VHF/UHF emergency radio;
- satellite communication where necessary;
- sirens and loudspeakers;
- mosque announcements;
- designated community volunteers; and
- SMS/cell-broadcast or other mass-alert mechanisms where available.
The warning must reach people even if one communication system fails.
4. Install an audible local warning system
A siren at a strategic location downstream of the danger zone could be particularly valuable.
The system should have clearly defined signals—for example:
Alert → Prepare to evacuate → Evacuate immediately.
The warning should also be available in languages understood locally, rather than relying exclusively on technical terminology or written notices.
NDMA's disaster-management guidance specifically emphasises communicating warnings in local languages and involving communities in evacuation procedures and drills.
5. Prepare an evacuation map for Danyore
The authorities should identify:
- areas potentially exposed to a Manugah flood;
- safe elevated locations;
- evacuation routes;
- alternative routes if the principal road is blocked;
- schools, mosques and public buildings suitable as temporary shelters;
- vulnerable households; and
- locations where elderly, children and persons with disabilities may require assistance.
The map should not remain in a government file. Every potentially affected household should know where to go when the siren sounds.
6. Conduct community evacuation drills
A warning system is useless if people do not know what to do after receiving the warning.
At least one practical drill should be conducted before each high-risk season, involving the district administration, GBDMA, Rescue 1122, police, health authorities, local government, schools, community organisations and residents.
NDMA's GLOF guidance already calls for proactive monitoring, evacuation drills and public awareness in vulnerable communities.
7. Protect critical infrastructure
The Manugah water complex, storage tank, water channel, roads, bridges, electricity installations and other public infrastructure should be assessed against the probable flood/debris-flow pathway.
The protective embankment currently under consideration should therefore not be treated merely as an ordinary civil-works project. Its design should be based on a proper hydrological and debris-flow assessment, including consideration of the size and velocity of possible flood waves and boulder impacts.
The August inspection had already identified floodwater, debris and large stones as threats to the water installations.
8. Keep the nullah and floodway free from obstruction
No new construction should be permitted within identified high-risk flood paths.
Existing encroachments, debris accumulation and obstructions should be surveyed and, where necessary and lawful, removed.
Channelisation can reduce risk at selected locations, but it should not create a false sense of security. A major flood carrying enormous quantities of sediment and boulders can overwhelm an inadequately designed channel.
9. Create a Manugah emergency response protocol
There should be a written protocol answering five basic questions:
Who monitors?
Who confirms?
Who orders evacuation?
Who sounds the alarm?
Who conducts rescue?
Responsibility should not become confused between departments during an emergency.
A designated Manugah Nullah Emergency Focal Point at the district level could maintain 24-hour contact with GBDMA and the relevant technical agencies during periods of elevated risk.
The authorities already possess the institutional framework
This is perhaps the most important point.
The issue is not that Pakistan lacks a disaster-management framework.
In July 2026, NDMA briefed the GB Chief Minister about GLOF risks, early-warning systems and emergency-response procedures, noting that its National Emergencies Operation Center conducts 24-hour monitoring of weather, rivers, streams and potential disaster risks. NDMA stressed that timely early warning, effective coordination and institutional synergy are essential for reducing disaster losses.
Only days earlier, NDMA had reviewed GLOF preparedness in GB and directed relevant departments to maintain local resources and use all available communication channels for public awareness.
There is therefore no justification for treating Manugah as an issue outside the existing disaster-management system.
Indeed, community-based flood early-warning systems have already been piloted in Gilgit-Baltistan. ICIMOD reports that such systems have enabled local communities to monitor hazards, interpret warnings and relay information to downstream populations and authorities.
From reaction to prevention
The tragedy of mountain disasters is that governments frequently become highly active after the event—conducting rescue operations, repairing roads, rebuilding channels and compensating victims.
But modern disaster management demands something different:
Spend a rupee before the disaster to save many rupees—and, more importantly, human lives—after it.
The request from the people of Danyore for an SCOM tower should therefore be accepted as a starting point, not the end of the discussion.
What Manugah needs is a comprehensive early-warning and risk-reduction system, supported by scientific monitoring, reliable communications, physical mitigation, community preparedness and a tested evacuation plan.
A modest demand with potentially enormous consequences
The people living below a glacier or hazardous nullah should not have to become disaster experts to remain alive. They have a right to expect that the state will monitor the hazard, warn them in time and provide a safe route to higher ground.
The question raised by Abshar TV—“When will the responsible institutions wake up?”—should therefore not be dismissed as criticism of the administration. It should be treated as a legitimate public-safety reminder.
Manugah Nullah should become a model of anticipatory disaster management in Gilgit-Baltistan rather than another case in which authorities act only after lives and property have been lost.
The time to install the communication tower, establish monitoring equipment, prepare evacuation routes, conduct community drills and strengthen vulnerable infrastructure is before the next flood—not after it.
A disaster may be natural; a preventable loss of life need not be.
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