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I recently came across an image of a crucial letter dating back to 1995—likely preserved in the archives of the relevant authorities—in which the then Chief Secretary of Gilgit-Baltistan astutely highlighted the region’s ground realities and, with commendable administrative foresight, made thoughtful recommendations to the then Central Board of Revenue, as follows:
A
Crucial Document Reflecting the Ground Realities of Gilgit-Baltistan (1995)
Key
Highlights & Strategic Significance
1.
Political and Constitutional Status
The letter candidly addresses the ambiguous
constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan:
- Though under de facto control of Pakistan since
1947, the region was not included in Article I of the Constitution.
- It was administered through federal discretion, with
limited application of laws and no representation in the national
legislature.
- The establishment of a separate Chief Court of
Northern Areas (without appellate access to the Supreme Court) is
emblematic of its isolation from Pakistan's mainstream judiciary.
2.
Historic Role in Liberation & Accession
The letter acknowledges:
- The self-liberation by the locals and subsequent
voluntary accession to Pakistan.
- The role of local tribes and Rajas in making a
unanimous decision to join Pakistan, followed by the dispatch of the first
Political Agent under Jinnah’s directive—lending moral and legal
legitimacy to their claim for inclusion.
3.
Socio-Economic Deprivation
The document paints a stark picture
of chronic underdevelopment:
- Absence of access to the national grid (WAPDA), natural
gas, PTV, and industries.
- A lack of employment opportunities, forcing
thousands of educated youth into poverty and, in some cases, sectarian
violence or unrest.
4.
Border Trade as a Lifeline
- After the opening of the Karakoram Highway in 1978,
small-scale border trade with Xinjiang (China) emerged as a crucial
survival avenue.
- Loans by banks and DFIs helped unemployed youth start micro-businesses
involving imports from China.
- The letter recognizes the social stability gained
by this engagement and warns that disturbance at the Sust Customs Check
Post could reverse this progress.
5.
Customs Checkpoint Crisis
- The Customs Act, 1969, was extended to the region in
1980, but strict implementation without local consideration led to repeated
law and order breakdowns.
- In 1995, tightened customs enforcement at Sust
stranded goods and youth in Kashgar and the border, exacerbating tensions.
Observation
The persistence of the Federal
Board of Revenue (FBR) in maintaining a policy that vehemently
disregards the ground realities of Gilgit-Baltistan has, over time,
engendered a horrific situation. Rather than evolving policy to address
the region’s constitutional ambiguity and economic fragility, FBR’s rigidity
inadvertently pushed many into exploiting loopholes.
A new phenomenon emerged: “Carrying”—a
practice where opportunists started transporting merchandise belonging
to traders from other parts of Pakistan, across the border from China, against
a meager commission. These goods were then cleared through Sust by hook
or by crook, further stoking legal and constitutional anomalies.
In stark contrast, the youth of
Gilgit-Baltistan, driven by poverty and lack of options, attempting to
bring in modest quantities for local consumption under baggage rules,
were targeted, penalized, and strangled economically.
This dual policy effectively:
- Fattened a few middlemen (carriers), who became millionaires and beyond;
- Enabled large-scale traders (operating remotely from cities) to become trillionaires
through unchecked tax evasion;
- Stripped the region’s youth of dignity and opportunity, perpetuating hopelessness;
- And caused substantial loss to the national
exchequer, undermining the very purpose of regulation.
Thus, the FBR's flawed approach not only helped manipulating the region’s constitutional limbo and
underdevelopment ad nauseam, to enrich a tiny, well-connected
coterie at the cost of the region’s future.
Proposed
Solutions in the 1995 Letter (Still Relevant Today)
The Chief Secretary offered
pragmatic and humane solutions:
- Immediate clearance of stranded goods at Sust as a one-time concession.
- Issuance of a Special SRO allowing limited imports
under baggage rules for GB residents.
- Delegation of appellate authority under Section 6 of the Customs Act to the local
administration, acknowledging the region's isolation and limited
resources.
- Distinct treatment for importers from other parts of
Pakistan, with appropriate duties and strict enforcement—while
facilitating and protecting the livelihood of the locals.
Concluding
Note
This 1995 communication is far more
than an administrative record—it is a strategic policy document that
reveals how insensitive governance, if allowed to persist, perpetuates
injustice and sows long-term discontent. As Gilgit-Baltistan continues to
seek constitutional clarity and economic equity, this letter remains a touchstone,
urging the state to revisit not only its policies but also its moral
contract with the people of the region.
Supplementary Reflection: The Border Pass System and NATCL Legacy
The 1995
communication referenced above reveals a rare instance of administrative prudence. It should have
compelled the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) to adopt a more nuanced and
region-specific approach by framing special
baggage rules to benefit the local,
deprived segments of Gilgit-Baltistan. These segments—continuously
issued Border Passes rather than passports—have a long-standing,
state-recognized right and rationale to
cross into Kashgar, not for recreation or tourism, but out of economic necessity.
Indeed, the raison d’être of the Border Pass system lies in facilitating these economically-marginalized
communities, providing them with an outlet to alleviate their hardship through modest-scale trade with
neighboring Xinjiang.
Historically, under the first Barter Trade Protocol of 1967, a
formal body—the Northern Areas Traders
Cooperative Limited (NATCL)—was established in Gilgit. This
cooperative spearheaded organized barter
trade with Chinese counterparts in Kashgar, and border passes were issued exclusively to its
caravan members for this limited and controlled cross-border economic
activity.
However, with a policy shift in 1986, when the border was opened to general tourism, issuance of Border Passes became widespread among locals.
Yet these were clearly not intended for
leisure travel. Given the socio-economic context, their real purpose
remained grounded in small-scale economic
engagement rather than tourism—something that should have been clearly understood and respected by federal
authorities.
Unfortunately, FBR’s continued disregard for these realities criminalized the youth who used their
border passes to bring back modest
baggage goods for local consumption, while failing to clamp down on the larger “Carry System”. In
this systemic distortion,
Customs staff at Sust not only looked the other way, but in some cases, facilitated the funneling of massive imports by
proxy “carriers”—effectively marginalizing the rightful local traders.
This misguided policy climate, where legal and constitutional ambiguities were manipulated to the advantage of a remote elite, undermined both the spirit of the barter trade legacy and the trust of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. It defeated the original intent of the Border Pass system and enabled a predatory practice where those least entitled profited the most, while local youth were hounded for exercising a right implicitly granted to them.It is high time this policy is urgently reviewed to allow the local people to bring in items in reasonable quantities under baggage rules without hindrance. However, there should be strict checks to prevent any attempt on their part to “carry” goods on behalf of traders or importers from outside Gilgit-Baltistan.
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